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Soviet Jewish emigration is at a 
crossroads today. Conditions that have 
impelled more than three-quarters of a 
million Jews to leave the USSR during 
the past 45 years have radically 
changed in recent months, altering the 
character and dynamics of the exodus 
and raising important questions 
concerning its future. Will the current 
flight of Jews continue, will it grow, or 
will new developments in the Soviet 
successor states and elsewhere slow 
the exodus or end it altogether? 
Whichever course is taken, what will 
its consequences be for the emigrants, 
the former USSR, and the West? 
The events that have led Soviet 
Jewish emigration to this juncture are 
well known because they have been 
widely reported in the press. Their 
ramifications for the movement are not 
as well understood, however, because 
they have not been studied until now. 
This article examines the changes in 
recent Soviet Jewish emigration and 
assesses their implications for the 
future. 
Soviet Emigration Until Now 
The recent changes in Soviet Jewish 
emigration can be best understood if 
they are viewed in historical 
perspective - that is, against the 
background of the movement's 
evolution until now. Since the exodus 
beganin 1948, more than 778,000 Soviet 
Jews have emigrated to the West-two 
thirds of them to Israel, nearly one- 
third to the United States, and the 
remainder to other countries (see the 
table). Between 1948 and 1989 the 
number of emigrants averaged fewer 
than 10,000 persons annually. As a 
result of Gorbachev's reforms, 
however, the level rose to unprec- 
edented heights in 1990 and 1991. 
Until 1990, the emigrants' motives 
for leaving were threefold. Religious 
and Zionist Jews to wanted to "return" 
to Israel, while others left to escape 
persecution and discrimination or to 
seek freedom and a better life in the 
West. By 1990, these reasons for leaving 
began to change. Most religious and 
Soviet Jewish Emigration, 1948-1991 
Zionist Jews had left the Soviet Union, 
and Gorbachev's reforms ended 
official antisemitism, introduced 
democracy and religious freedom, and 
liberalized emigration. However, his 
policies also led to political 
disintegration, economic disarray, 
ethnic conflict and the rise of grassroots 
antisemitism. 
Seeking to escape the economic 
and political disorder and fearful that 
they would be made scapegoats for it, 
unprecedented numbers of Jews 
rushed to leave the USSR. Whereas in 
1987 only 8,200 Jews had emigrated 
from the USSR, in 1988 the number rose 
to 19,400, in 1989 to 72,500, and in 1990 
and 1991 to 201,300 and 186,000, 
respectively. Because in 1989 the 
United States had set a quota on 
immigration from the USSR of 50,000 
persons annually, the vast majority of 
1990 and 1991 emigrants went to Israel, 
where they could resettle without limit 
(see the table). 
Current Soviet Jewish Emigration 
Today Soviet Jews are in an 
unprecedented position of being able 
to choose whether to leave the former 
USSR or to stay and take advantage of 
Number of Annual - Destinations - the new reforms. Both choices have 
Period Emigrants Average Israel U.S. Othersa attractions but also shortcomings. 
What they decide to do will depend 
1948-89 391,000 9,300 191,900 170,800 28,300 upon the outcome of two contending 
sets of forces. One set of forces 
1990 201,300 - 181,800 6,500 13,000 impelling them to leave includes the 
threat of economic collapse, deepening 
1991b 186,000 - 145,000 35,000 6,000 political disintegration and growing 
antisemitism. They also fear that there 
Total 778,300 - 518,700 212,300 may be a return of repressive 47'300 authoritarian regimes or that access to 
Israel may somehow be restricted. 
a Other places include Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and countries in Many observers see only these Europe and South America. negative forces and predict a massive Figures for 1991 are estimates because precise data were not available at the time of exodus in the near future of virtually 
writing in early 1992. the entire Soviet Tewish vouulation. 
a A 
Sources: Israeli Embassy, Washington, D.C.; Israeli Consulate General, New York; Hebrew What they overlbok or minimize, 
Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS); and US. Department of State. however, is the fact that there are also 
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other powerful forces encouraging 
Soviet Jews to remain in their 
homeland. These include optimism 
about the future because of the recent 
democratic reforms, a revival of Jewish 
religion, culture, and community life,' 
and the public condemnation by 
several leading political figures of past 
persecution of Jews and assurances of 
a secure place for them in the new 
successor states. There is also much 
resistance to leaving the former USSR 
because of a strong attachment Soviet 
Jews have to their hbmeland, the 
difficulty of parting with friends and 
relatives, and a reluctance to pull up 
roots, leave satisfying positions and 
accustomed life styles, and undertake 
the hardships of starting anew in 
foreign places. Moreover, they are now 
able to travel abroad freely, making it 
unnecessary to emigrate in order to 
avail themselves of opportunities in 
the West. 
Finally, there is mounting 
concern over the severe shortages of 
housing and suitable jobs in Israel and 
the growing tensions in the Middle 
East. Many Jews who have already 
emigrated are today urging friends 
and relatives in the former Soviet 
Union to postpone leaving or forgo it 
altogether because of daunting 
problems for new immigrants to the 
Jewish state which the Israeli 
government appears to be unable or 
unwilling to resolve, and there has 
even been a small return flow of 
disillusioned emigrants back to their 
places of origin. 
One result of the conflict between 
these two sets of forces is that although 
1990 and 1991 were record high years 
of Soviet Jewish emigration, the 
number of emigrants fell far short of 
the 400,000 to 500,000 persons annually 
the Israeli government had hoped for, 
setting back its plan to resettle one 
million Soviet immigrants by 1995. The 
reason for the shortfall was that many 
individuals who could have left chose 
not to do so. According to Israeli 
authorities Soviet Jews today hold 
200,000 entry visas and one million 
invitations to move to the Jewish state, 
meaning that virtually the entire 
Jewish population reported by the 
1989 Soviet census (1.4 million 
persons) could emigrate if they chose 
toB2 Most of them, however, are 
reportedly "sitting on their suitcases," 
in the words of one observer, awaiting 
the outcome of developments at home, 
in Israel, and in the West before 
deciding what to do. 
Prospects for the future 
Thus, contrary to a widespread belief 
that the vast majority of Soviet Jews 
urgentlywant to leave the former USSR 
and will do so soon, the fact is that they 
have viable options today. They can 
choose to vacate the former USSR en 
masse, which would mean the end of 
the historic Jewish presence there; 
remain and accommodate themselves 
to the emerging social and political 
order, which would put an end to mass 
Jewish emigration; or find a 
compromise between the two. Judging 
by the recent past, the course they will 
take will depend mainly upon future 
developments in the former Soviet 
Union and Israel. 
If conditions in the successor 
states worsen, most Jews will 
undoubtedly emigrate to Israel, 
regardless of the problems there 
(unless the United States or other 
Western countries liberalize their 
immigration policies, which is highly 
unlikely). If, however, circumstances 
improve in the former USSR or 
deteriorate in the Jewish state, many if 
not most Soviet Jews may decide to 
remain where they are indefinitely. 
These are only surmises, of course, 
for there is no reliable information 
concerningthe intentions of hundreds of 
thousands of diverse and physically 
dispersed individuals with many 
generational, occupational and 
philosophical differences. What is 
certain is that the course they choose will 
have profound consequences for them, 
for Israel and for the West. If most Soviet 
Jews remain in the former USSR and 
rebuild their religious and cultural life 
there, it will mark the start of a new 
historic era in the annals of Soviet Jewry. 
If most of them move to Israel, however, 
it will profoundly alter Israeli society, 
culture, and politics. 
Thus, Soviet Jewish emigration 
stands at a historic crossroads today 
from which two or three divergent 
paths lead out. Which one will be 
followed cannot be known, but 
whichever it is will have momentous 
import for the future. ta 
Notes 
1. According to the Va'ad, the Soviet 
Jewish umbrella group, there are 
more than 350 Jewish religious, 
cultural, educational, and social 
organizations and scores of new or 
restored synagogues and temples in 
the Soviet successor states today, 
with the number reportedly growing 
rapidly. 
2. Estimates of the "actual" number of 
Soviet Jews range as high as three 
million persons, depending upon 
how Jewish identity is defined and 
who is doing the estimating. Soviet 
census figures reflect only self- 
reported ethnic identification, but 
many Jews, like members of other 
disadvantaged Soviet minorities, 
obscure their nationality or are 
uncertain of it because of assimilation 
and intermarriage. 
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